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Prologue

to France, Thomas Jefferson, had loathed
George III from afar for years. Almost a full decade earlier, the thirtythree-year-old Jefferson had denounced the British monarch: usurper,
plunderer, oppressor. Had his draft of the Declaration of Independence not
been edited by the Continental Congress, it would have added that the
king of England "waged cruel war against human nature itself."
On March 17, 1786,Jefferson waited at the Court of St.James's to
meet the English king. He was accompanied by another hero of the
American Revolution, his dose friend John Adams, the American minister to Great Britain. They hoped to negotiate a commercial treaty
between Great Britain and her former colonies. Jefferson was no
longer a young American revolutionary, but a prominent member of
an independent government's diplomatic corps. And though the
United States was a struggling young confederation, no match in political, economic, or military might for Great Britain,Jefferson expected
to be treated with the respect due a representative of a sovereign
nation.
At noon on that March day, George III entered the palatial chamber
where Jefferson and Adams waited with other foreign envoys to be formally presented. Neither Jefferson nor Adams recorded the event in
letters or journals at the time. But as an old man, Jefferson recalled
with bitterness the moment that he was introduced to the British king.
THE AMERICAN MINISTER
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Nothing could have been more ungracious, Jefferson remembered,
than his introduction to King George and Qy.een Charlotte. The king
barely acknowledged Jefferson's presence, which may have had something to do with the monarch's low regard for the author of the Declaration of Independence.
Adams's grandson, the historian Charles Francis Adams, later pro- ,
vided a vivid explanation for Jefferson's reaction. Upon his grandfather's presentation ofJefferson to the king and queen, they rose from
their chairs and turned around so that the two American ministers
were faced with their royal posteriors.
Jefferson's sour memory of the event is more important than the fact
that modern historians have poked large holes in bothJefferson's and
Charles Francis Adams's versions of the event. It is improbable that
Qy.een Charlotte was present in court that day, since, by tradition,
George III presided alone at the twice-weekly levees such as the one
attended by Jefferson and Adams. The king's practice, moreover, was
to greet visitors during a "walkabout" of the room, much as contemporary leapers of state customarily do at official ceremonies. If that was
the case, it would have been virtually impossible for King George to
turn his back on Jefferson without performing an abrupt about-face, an
exercise that no one claimed to have witnessed.
Details aside,Jefferson's antipathy for Great Britain's monarch was
real enough, and enduring, as was his abiding mistrust of the motives
and policies of His Majesty's government. Those feelings were reinforced when he and Adams met with the marquis of Carmarthen, the
English secretary of state for foreign affairs, to work out the terms of a
commercial treaty.
Before their meeting with Lord Carmarthen, Adams and Jefferson
had discussed the terms that might be included in an agreement. At the
instruction of Congress, Adams had already proposed that the resolution of political issues be a part of any commercial treaty. Specifically,
Adams requested that any settlement of outstanding claims of British
creditors against Americans be combined with an agreement that the
British relinquish their military outposts in the old Northwest Territory
(as yet, an unfulfilled promise of the 1783 Peace Treaty). Adams had
also asked that Great Britain provide financial compensation for slaves
and other property expropriated by British troops during the Revolu-
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tionary War, a demand of more than diplomatic concern to Jefferson.
While governor of Virginia in 1781,Jefferson was not only forced to
retreat from the temporary state capital of Charlottesville by invading
British troops, but later discovered that General Cornwallis's soldiers
had overrun his Monticello estate, absconded with thirty of his slaves,
and burned his entire year's crop of tobacco.Jefferson did not dwell on
those past grievances in his strategy session with Adams, or, for that
matter, on his steadily mounting debts to British creditors. He focused
on general negotiating points, insisting that any treaty include not only
absolute commercial reciprocity between the two nations but the
exchange of citizenship rights, so that Americans and the British would·
each enjoy the same protections on the other's soil.
Adams and Jefferson made the oddest of diplomatic couples, both in
physical stature and temperament. Adams was short (five feet seven
inches), plump, and naturally combative;Jefferson stood over six feet
two inches, was lean and long-limbed, and projected an air of cool
detachment. Once the American ministers began rheir.discussions with
Lord Carmarthen, it became immediately apparent that neither their
diplomatic skills nor their careful preparations would be rewarded.
The British secretary of state wasted no time in informing the Americans of the cold facts of life between two such unequal nations. He
made clear that His Majesty's government would dictate the terms of
any treaty, and quickly ruled out any discussion of political issues. The
British secretary's tepid attempts to respond to Adams andJefferson's
trade proposals were so vague and evasive,Jefferson observed, that he
could not have been serious about an agreement.
In the weeks that followed, Jefferson's initial pessimism deepened.
After he and Adams received word that the British Foreign Office
would entertain a redrafted proposal from the Americans limited to
commercial subjects, Adams andJefferson worked furiously overnight
to rewrite their previously submitted treaty terms. Lord Carmarthen
did not respond, though he knew that Adams's and Jefferson's congressional commissions to reach agreement on a treaty were to expire
by the end of May.
Later, Jefferson concluded that the British government had never
intended to sign a trade treaty with the United States. This was made
obvious from the dismissive treatment that he and Adams had received
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at Whitehall, which, Jefferson surmised, was rooted in British arrogance and the conviction that the British had nothing to gain from a
treaty with the fledgling nation.
Lord Carmarthen's attitude toward the American ministers reflected
the British assessment of the international status of the new nation they
represented. The United States had signed a peace treaty with Great,
Britain three years earlier, but the end of hostilities had not brought
Americans power, prosperity, or, in truth, genuine independence. The
mother country still dominated her former colonies, not so much by
the sword as by the purse. With Americans' appetite for British manufactured goods, the balance of trade tilted overwhelmingly eastward.
And Great Britain did not hesitate to press her advantage. She continued to seal off American goods from the lucrative British West Indies
market, while her superior navy patrolled the commercial corridors of
the Atlantic and the Caribbean.
Jefferson suspected that there was more to the rough British treatment that he and Adams received than diplomatic calculation. "That
nation hates us," Jefferson wrote, "their ministers hate us, and their
king, more than all other men."
That harsh assessment was more than reciprocated. Jefferson
detested the hauteur that permeated the high echelons of British government and society, and speculated that perhaps it had something to
do with their unbalanced, meat-heavy diet. Nor did he like the cold,
damp British climate. And he found London's architecture positively
"wretched."
Jefferson could not deny, of course, that the British had made significant contributions to Western civilization, and during his seven-week
visit, he took full advantage of what the nation had to offer.John and
Abigail Adams escorted him to the British Museum and to Covent
Garden, where he attended performances of Macbeth and The Merchant
ef Venice. He made the requisite tourist's pilgrimage to Shakespeare's
birthplace at Stratford-upon-Avon (and recorded the price of admission: one shilling). Adams organized for his guest an extended tour of
British estates and gardens, whichJefferson judged superior to any that
he had seen in France or the United States. With notebook in hand
and a copy of Thomas Whateley's Observations on Modern Gardening in
his pocket, he took copious notes on his own observations, and later
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appropriated some of the best ideas for his home and gardens in the
Virginia mountains.
No nation, Jefferson admitted, could compete with the British for
ingenious mechanical innovations. He was awed by the steam-powered
grist mill at Blackfriars on the Thames and predicted that the newly
discovered source of energy would soon propel ships. He marveled at
a portable copying press that could instantly replicate a letter and
bought one for himself, as well as several other gadgets, including a
solar microscope, a globe telescope, a protractor, and a thermometer.
And, with AbigailAdams, he shopped and shopped, purchasing a new
suit, a carriage and plated harness, and a harpsichord for his fourteen- '
year-old-daughter, Patsy.

For all of the private pleasures that London and the English countryside had provided him, Jefferson was delighted to return to Paris.
Among the nations of the world, France had occupied a specialplace in
Jefferson's head and heart since the Revolution, when she gave critical
support to the Americans against the British. France offered true
heroes to match America's own, such as th~ brave young nobleman
the General Marquis de Lafayette.Jefferson and Lafayette were the
best of friends in Paris, where the Frenchman proudly displayed a
framed copy of the Declaration of Independence in his study. As Jefferson's most valued political adviser, Lafayette helped the American
minister navigate the labyrinthine French governmental bureaucracy.
And Jefferson needed all the help he could get as he attempted, with
only modest success,to persuade the government to lower the high tariffs on American goods.
By 1786, there were faint rumblings that the French government
faced impending bankruptcy and that Louis XVI was incapable of
managing a financial crisis or the rising public unrest. Jefferson
remained confident that crisis could be averted and that peaceful
accommodation could be reached among the king, the nobles and
clergy,and the commoners.
In general,Jefferson's attitude toward life and politics had become
noticeably more sanguine in Paris, where the gaiety and sophistication
of the French had provided the perfect elixir for his low spirits when he
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arrived in 1784 as minister plenipotentiary to France. At that time,Jefferson's suffering was due to excruciating disappointment and loss that
had beset him in Virginia. In 1781, the state legislature had called for
an official investigation into his behavior as wartime governor. His
detractors charged that he had acted both irresponsibly and cowardly,
first, in not making necessary preparations to defend the state, and
then in fleeing from invading British troops. Although no investigation
ever occurred,Jefferson felt compelled to justify his actions in a powerful speech on the floor of the House of Delegates. But the bad taste of
the accusations lingered. And the next year, Jefferson's wife, Martha,
died following the birth of their sixth child. Her death left him griefstricken and responsible for the care of their three surviving children.
Once he had settled into his residence at the Hotel de Langeac, a
spacious three-story villa near the Champs-Elysees, Jefferson's spirits
demonstrably brightened. In contrast to his decidedly negative views
of the British, Jefferson admired the polite manners and contagious
conviviality of the French. He loved their cuisine and fine wines, their
stimulating salons and plentiful evening concerts. And he was so
impressed by the classical Roman architecture in France, particularly
the Maison-Carree at Nimes, that he successfully implored Virginia's
directors of public buildings to change the design of the state capitol,
after the foundation had been laid, to emulate the Nimes model.
Jefferson had promised his wife on her deathbed that he would
never remarry. We now know that he later engaged in a lasting relationship with his beautiful young slave, Sally Hemings, who joined his
staff of servants in Paris. And while in the French capital, Jefferson
courted Maria Cosway, the enchanting wife of the British miniaturist
Richard Cosway. For six weeks in the late summer and fall of 1786,Jefferson and Maria were virtually inseparable, touring galleries, attending concerts in the Tuileries, and strolling in the Bois de Boulogne.
Later, Jefferson's ardor for Maria cooled, though they remained
friends and long-distance correspondents for decades.
As enamored as Jefferson was with his life in Paris, he kept close tabs
on political developments in the United States, primarily through regular correspondence with his Virginia ally,James Madison, who in the
summer of 1787 was a delegate to the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia.Jefferson and Madison had served together in Virginia's
legislature. Both men had understood their collaborative roles:Jefferson

1

PROLOGUE

was the visionary whose ideas and lilting phrases breathed life into the
abstract demands for individual rights and liberties. He valued Madison
for his extraordinary intellect and shrewd judgment. A subtle, sophisticated political thinker, Madison knew how to translate Jefferson's grand
concepts into law. An early example of their successful joint efforts was
the passage of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, which called
for a strict separation between church and state. Jefferson had contributed the eloquent draft; Madison had devised the winning legislative
strategy and, in the process, offered his own brilliant defense of religious.
liberty.
Madison had much to report to Jefferson after the convention in
Philadelphia. The document reflected Madison's and the other
framers' commitment to representative democracy under a tripartite
federal system. But throughout the document, there were compromises, both among the three branches of the federal government and
between the federal government and the states. After the struggle for
passage at the Constitutional Convention, Madison and other Federalists knew that they faced formidable opposition to ratification by the
states. It would be led by Anti-Federalists, who continued to object to
the substantial power given to the federal government at the expense of
the states, as well as the absence of a Bill of Rights.
Madison could not have been happy, then, that Jefferson's initial
reaction to the document he had worked so mightily to create was
unenthusiastic. At first,Jefferson expressed disappointment that a few
provisions had not been added to the old Articles of Confederation,
which gave the dominant government power to the states, rather than
replacing the entire document. With memories of the British monarchy
still fresh, Jefferson worried that the renewable four-year term for the
U.S. president invited monarchy by another name. Once a president
was elected to office,Jefferson feared, he could control the levers of
power so that he effectively could hold office for life. Jefferson also
shared the Anti-Federalists' concern that the Constitution did not
include a Bill of Rights to protect individual citizens from the potential
tyranny of a powerful central government. To make matters worse for
Madison, reports ofJefferson's reservations about the document circulated publicly and were eagerly repeated by Anti-Federalist leaders,
such as Virginia's great orator Patrick Henry, who urged his state's
delegates to vote "no" on the Constitution.
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By the time Virginia's delegates convened in Richmond on June 2,
1788, to vote on the Constitution, eight states had already approved
the document, one short of the number needed for ratification. But the '
numbers were deceptive and did not guarantee ultimate success. In
fact, the Constitution had stirred fierce opposition, even in states that,
like Pennsylvania, the Federalists had considered safely in their column. And now came the battle for Virginia, the nation's most populous and prosperous state. The most influential native son, George
Washington, was fully supportive of the Constitution. But he was not
in Richmond and could only offer his encouragement by letter to
Madison, who directed the Federalist forces. That Jefferson was also
absent was not necessarily detrimental to the Constitution's cause,
given his stated ambivalence about the document. There was, to be
sure, talent enough to make the case for the Constitution. Besides
Madison, 'the Federalists could call upon leaders of the Virginia bar,
including Governor Edmund Randolph, the venerable advocate
Edmund Pendleton, and a thirty-two-year-old Richmond lawyer
named John Marshall.
The Virginia Anti-Federalists were well equipped to challenge the
formidable Madison and his allies. They were led by Patrick Henry,
the more cerebral member of the Virginia establishment, George
Mason, and Jefferson's protege.james Monroe, who provided multiple
reasons for the delegates to reject the Constitution. The debate raged
over three weeks in a two-year-old wooden building known as the New
Academy, where the cramped, sweltering delegates traded barbs and
arguments in the sultry June heat. Throughout the sessions, Madison
remained apprehensive about the Federalists' chances of success. The
main reason for his trepidation was the opposition of Henry, whose
impassioned arguments continually captivated the convention. If
Henry's rhetorical spell over wavering delegates was sustained, the
powerful and influential state of Virginia would reject the Constitution,
and the ninth and crucial vote for ratification might never be cast.
Once he had the floor, Henry, stooped, bespectacled, and looking
much older than his fifty-two years, wasted no time in striking the
most fearful chord of the Anti-Federalists. "The question turns," he
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said, "on that poor little thing-the expression, 'We, the people; instead
of the states?" With that sly elusion, Henry suggested, the Federalists
had imperiled everything that the colonists had fought for, not just the
sovereignty of the states but also individual liberties. The confederation of the states, he reminded his opponents, had won the War of
Independence. And for what? To be replaced by an all-powerful central
government that "will oppress and ruin the people." The Constitution
"squints toward monarchy," Henry declared. "Your President may easily become a king," he continued, raising the issue that had alarmed'
Jefferson. Henry accused the framers of eviscerating the executive and
legislative powers of the states. And with the creation of a federal judiciary, "the scales ofjustice are to be given away." Do not abandon the
Articles of Confederation, he pleaded, claiming that no less a patriot
than Thomas Jefferson agreed with him. "It [the Confederation] rendered us victorious in that bloody conflict with a powerful nation. It
has secured us a territory greater than any European monarch possesses. And shall a government which has been this strong and vigorous be accused of imbecility and abandoned for want of energy?"
Madison was no orator and wisely decided not to try to compete
with Henry's pyrotechnics. Small, pale, and with a weak, reedy voice,
he addressed the delegates in a conversational, diffident manner, holding his hat (which contained his notes) in his hand. Madison never
overwhelmed an audience. But no one knew the intricacies of the Constitution better than he. Over the course of the three-week debate,
Madison methodically laid out the case for a constitution, delivering,
in effect, a comprehensive treatise on the document.
Slowly, Madison proceeded to undercut Henry's argument that the
framers had created a federal engine for oppression. The overriding
purpose of the Constitution was to provide an effective governing
structure for a representative democracy. The people were protected
through the system of checks and balances among the three branches
of the federal government. Taking the Constitution as a whole, Madison insisted that there was ample protection against monarchy in the
office of the presidency or the accumulation of imperious powers by
Congress or the federal judiciary. And the states remained sovereign,
he reminded the delegates, on issues that did not concern the federal
government.
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As to the need for a Bill of Rights, Madison argued before the convention, as he did privately to Jefferson, that the Constitution did not
give the federal government authority to intrude on the individual liberties of citizens, and that therefore explicit guarantees were unnecessary. He rejected Henry's suggestion that the Constitution should be
amended to include a Bill of Rights before ratification. Ratify first, said
Madison, adjust for imperfections in the document later.
Madison noted to the delegates that Henry had invokedJefferson's
name. Mr. Jefferson endorsed many of the Constitution's provisions
that Anti-Federalists claimed he opposed, Madison said, an assurance
that was backed by Jefferson's statements in his private correspondence with Madison. Despite his reservations,Jefferson had ultimately
agreed with Madison on the need for ratification. And Madison
accepted Jefferson's argument that there must be a Bill of Rights,
which Madison later drafted.
Pendleton and Randolph also hammered away at the Anti-Federalists' arguments against ratification. But the outcome was still in doubt
when the Federalists called upon the services of youngJohn Marshall.
Marshall had only been practicing law for five years and did not enjoy
the stature in the legal community of Randolph or Pendleton. But he
was a Revolutionary War hero, having served with Washington at Valley Forge, and had already begun to build a reputation as an outstanding state legislator and lawyer.
Marshall and Jefferson were second cousins, both descendants of
the prominent Randolph family of Virginia, and, on the surface, they
appeared to have much in common. Both revered their fathers, who
had supervised educations that led them to study law with George
Wythe at the College of William and Mary. But Marshall and Jefferson's shared bloodline did not make them friends or political allies.
Unlike Jefferson, Marshall believed in a strong federal government, his
Federalist convictions permanently formed during the Revolutionary
War, when, as he later wrote, he considered "America as my country
and Congress as my government."
Like Jefferson, Marshall was a big man, over six feet tall. He had
piercing black eyes and dark, unkempt hair. His clothes appeared to be
rumpled even when he had hardly worn them. He was immensely
popular in Richmond, a hearty, gregarious fellow who liked to drink
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with his friends in the local taverns. When he addressed the convention in Richmond, his forensic skills had not fully developed; but he
was already an accomplished lawyer who knew how to make an effective argument.
Marshall chose to meet Henry's core argument, that the Constitution was an invitation to monarchy, head-on. His opponent misread
the document, he asserted. The Constitution provided for "a well regulated democracy" where no king, or president, could undermine representative government. His most sustained argument was saved for
the defense of a federal judiciary. The future chief justice of the United '
States told the delegates that an independent federal judiciary was a
necessary bulwark against an overreaching Congress. If Congress
were to exceed its powers, said Marshall, it would be the duty of the
judiciary to declare the action void.
Marshall's tone was conciliatory. He did not speak apocalyptically
of dire results that would inevitably follow if the delegates rejected the
Constitution. There might be "small defects," he conceded, but if the
other delegates were convinced, as he was, "that the good greatly preponderates," then they should vote for ratification. And if the Constitution proved to be less than the framers hoped or the people deserved,
there was ample provision for amendment.
Henry responded ruefully that Marshall was wrong in every particular of his argument. But the older man spoke of his antagonist without rancor. His opposition to Marshall's position, said Henry, did not
diminish his "highest veneration and respect for the honorable gentleman." Henry's compliment underscored one of Marshall's greatest talents, his ability to earn the respect of his adversaries. Except, as we
shall see, for ThomasJefferson.

By the timeJefferson received the news that the Virginia delegates had
voted, by a margin of eighty-nine to seventy-nine, to ratify the Constitution, he was fully supportive of Madison's successful efforts. But he
was less satisfied with developments in Paris, where efforts for a peaceful resolution of the grievances against Louis XVI were foundering. By
~e winter of 1789, it was clear that the nobles and clergy were exercising no moderating influence on the king, nor were they genuinely
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interested in pressing for financial and political reforms. In the spring,
bread lines lengthened, tempers exploded, and the streets became
ready incubators for violence.Jefferson did his part to accommodate
the growing demands of the masses, collaborating with Lafayette to
draft a declaration of rights that Lafayette introduced in the National
Assembly. Even after the storming of the Bastille,Jefferson did not
abandon his hope that governmental reforms could avoid the worst
excessesof revolution.
In September,whenJefferson and his two daughters, Martha (nicknamed Patsy) and Mary (called Maria or Polly), packed for a sixmonth home visit, the National Assembly was still in session trying to
draft a constitution, and the French Revolution was far from running
its course. But the massive social and political upheaval, only dimly
perceived a year earlier, was closer thanJefferson was yet prepared to
concede. He remained optimistic that the recent chaos would ultimately redound to the lasting benefit of France and the world. More
than ever, he was an unabashed Francophile. To the list of reasons for
his affection,Jefferson could now add his admiration for the ideals of
the incipient revolution. He believed that France's first halting steps
toward republican government would spread from Paris to other parts
of the European continent. And he was more convinced than ever that
France was the United States' most important ally,perfectly positioned
to serve as the necessary wedge to break the British stranglehold on
U.S. trade.
Expecting to return to Paris in the spring,Jefferson had renewed his
lease at the Hotel de Langeac and had left all of his furnishings in
place. When he and his daughters sailed on the Clermont for Norfolk,
they nonetheless transported thirty-eight boxes and several trunks of
possessions, as well as the carriage and harpsichordJefferson had purchased in London. Jefferson's intention was to settle Martha and
Maria permanently at Monticello,take care of important financialmatters, and then return for the remaining two years of his ministerial
term. But shortly after he arrived in Virginia, he was confronted with
an unwelcome alternative. He received a letter from President George
Washington inviting him to join the Cabinet as secretary of state. Jefferson much preferred to complete his tour in France, but he felt a loyalty to the nation's first president that he could not ignore. Soon after
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Jefferson received Washington's offer, Madison came calling, urging
him to accept the Cabinet post. Before long, he was serenaded with
praise from a committee of the local citizenry, an outpouring surely
orchestrated by his friend Madison. Despite the subtle pressure,Jefferson kept his own counsel and waited until January to inform Washington that he would accept his offer.

The first Cabinet in American history was small in size, but not in
intellectual firepower, thanks to the dominating presence of Jefferson
and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton. They were joined
by Henry Knox, Washington's secretary of war; and his part-time'
attorney general, Edmund Randolph. Vice President John Adams was
not considered a member of the Cabinet and did not attend their policy sessions.
Jefferson first met the thirty-five-year-old Hamilton in New York in
the spring of 1790, when both were newly appointed Cabinet members. Undoubtedly, Jefferson had learned something about Hamilton
from Madison, who had collaborated with Hamilton (and to a lesser
extent with John Jay, who would become the first chief justice of the
United States) in writing The Federalist, the classic defense of the Constitution that was published after the Constitutional Convention. But
nothing Madison could have toldJefferson would have prepared him
for the tightly wound human dynamo whom Washington chose as sec·
retary of the treasury.
Jefferson's and Hamilton's backgrounds could not have been more
different. Jefferson's first memory was of being carried on horseback
on a pillow by one of the family slaves. His father, Peter, a land surveyor and leader in his Albemarle County community, had left his son
more than fourteen hundred acres of land. Hamilton was, literally, a
poor bastard, born on the British West Indies island of Nevis to an
unhappily married woman, Rachel Lavien, and a wandering, financially inept Scottish merchant, James Hamilton. He eventually emigrated to New York, where he distinguished himself as a brilliant
special student at King's College (now Columbia University) and,
later, as a practicing attorney in Manhattan. As compensation for his
humble, illegitimate beginnings, it was later said, Hamilton was fueled
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by inexhaustible energy and ambition. He never seemed satisfied
merely to accomplish a difficult task; he attacked it in the most dramatic fashion possible. That was the case when the five-foot-seven,
slight Hamilton, as General Washington's field commander at Yorktown in 1781, leapt over a parapet ahead of his troops to assault a
British regiment.
Hamilton's and Jefferson's political philosophies were as different as,
their personalities and backgrounds.Jefferson's primary loyalties were
to states' rights, popular (iflimited) sovereignty, and individual liberty.
Hamilton was committed to a strong federal government. His convictions had been laid out in elaborate detail in the articles he wrote for
The Federalist. As secretary of the treasury, he was determined to put his
philosophical arguments into practice, consolidating the power of the
newly constituted national government.
In his first month in office, Hamilton sent the First Congress his
"Report on the Public Credit," a sweeping proposal for the federal government to assume over $75 million in public debt. He recommended
that the federal government accept responsibility not only for the
United States' domestic and foreign debts under the old Articles of
Confederation, but for an additional $25 million of debt incurred by
the states in prosecuting the Revolutionary War against Great Britain.
At first glance, Hamilton's proposal appeared to make the new federal government weaker, not stronger, because it would be saddled
with an enormous public debt. But his ingenious vision looked beyond
the short-term debt to the long-term gains that would accrue to the federal government. By drawing all financial obligations to the national
government, Hamilton immediately stanched the centrifugal economic
forces that had, in large part, doomed the Articles of Confederation.
He also offered Congress an urgent reason to collect taxes for the federal treasury-namely, to help pay off the gigantic national debt.
Hamilton's proposal challenged some of the most cherished tenets
of Jefferson's philosophy. Jefferson believed that America's destiny
depended upon a traditional agrarian economy that was based on the
hard work and democratic ideals of yeoman farmers. He deplored
public indebtedness and paper currencies, and the Northern speculators who profited from both. Most of all, he feared the consolidation of
power in the federal government. That had been his primary reserva-
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tion about the Constitution and remained so after its adoption. He
conceded broad power to the federal government only in the sphere of
foreign affairs. Domestically, he believed that the states represented the
most efficacious governmental unit, in large part because they were
closest to the people.
Although Jefferson viewed Hamilton's debt proposal warily, he was
not prepared to oppose it. He did not want to appear negative toward
his Cabinet colleague before they had yet had the opportunity to work
together. There was opposition enough to Hamilton's plan, and it
came most significantly from Madison, who had already made himself
the most influential leader in the House of Representatives. Besides his
general suspicion about the pull of Hamilton's program toward the
federal government, Madison was particularly concerned that it would
unfairly reward speculators who had bought government securities
from poor farmers, tradesmen, and Revolutionary War veterans at a
fraction of their par value, which, under Hamilton's plan, the federal
government would pay off.
When his proposal bogged down in Congress, Hamilton approached
Jefferson for help, asserting that the failure of the bill to pass would imperil the union. Despite his anxiety about Hamilton's proposal,Jefferson agreed to serve as a political power broker between the secretary of
the treasury and Madison, arranging for them to meet at his residence
on Maiden Lane in lower Manhattan to resolve their differences. By
evening's end, the three men had struck a deal.Jefferson and Madison
accepted Hamilton's plan for the federal government to assume the
states' debts. In return, Hamilton agreed to work on their behalf to relocate the nation's capital to the Potomac after a ten-year interim period in
Philadelphia. At the time, Jefferson was pleased with the agreement,
thinking that it would ultimately benefit the agrarian Southern states,
and particularly Virginia, which bordered on the Potomac. ButJefferson later admitted that it was the worst political decision he ever made,
providing Hamilton with the first important victory in his drive to increase the power of the federal government.
Hamilton hardly paused after his initial success before proposing a
second, equally bold financial innovation: the creation of a national
bank of the United States. Great Britain was his economic model.
Hamilton was impressed by the ambitious policies of the powerful
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British financial ministers and the essential role that the Bank of
England played in providing credit to the national government. He
anticipated that a national bank of the United States would serve the
nation much as the Bank of England functioned in Great Britain.
Responding to Hamilton's initiative, Congress passed a bill chartering
the Bank of the United States.
This time, Secretaryof StateJefferson did not pledge his cooperation
with Hamilton but instead urged Washington to veto the legislation.'
Now fully alert to the treasury secretary's centralizing agenda,Jefferson
contended that Congress could only do what was explicitly authorized
by the text of the Constitution. And nowhere in that document, he
maintained, was Congress given the authority to establish a national
bank-not even under the seemingly open-ended "necessary and
proper clause." The bank was not absolutely necessary for Congress to
exerciseits constitutional authority. If the term "necessary" could be so
loosely interpreted as to permit Congress to charter a national bank,
Jefferson maintained, there would be almost no end to which ingenious
minds might not torture the constitutional language. Under such a
broad interpretation,Jeffersoninsisted, the federal government "would
swallow up" all of the delegated powers of the states. And the framers
surely did not intend to authorize Congress "to break down the most
ancient and fundamental laws" of the states.
In his response, Hamilton made the argument that convinced President Washington. Hamilton maintained that the whole purpose of the
"necessary and proper" clause was to give "a liberal latitude to the
exercise of the specifiedpowers." The phrase did not grant Congress
independent powers, Hamilton conceded, but it did sanction the exercise of authority implied by their express constitutional powers. The.
relevant inquiry was whether the means selected by Congress was
related to an end explicitlygiven to the legislature in the Constitution.
And a national bank satisfied that constitutional standard, because it
would facilitateCongress's ability to collect taxes, borrow money, regulate commerce, and raise and support armies, all powers explicitly
*under Article I, section 8, of the Constitution, Congress is given the authority to tax,
regulate commerce, borrow money, and raise and support armies, among other powers, and "to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper" to implement those
powers.
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granted to Congress. "If the end be clearly comprehended with any of
the specified powers, and if the measure have an obvious relation to
that end, and is not forbidden by any particular provision of the Constitution," Hamilton declared, "it may safely be deemed to come within
the compass of the national authority."
After Hamilton bested Jefferson in the debate over the constitutionality of the national bank, the secretary of state viewed him as a dangerous enemy, not just of his philosophy but of the future of the
republic. The two Cabinet members' breach widened further when
Hamilton invaded Jefferson's official foreign-policy turf and,Jefferson
believed, systematically undermined the secretary of state's initiatives.
Their disagreements centered on U.S. relations with Great Britain.
Hamilton considered Great Britain to be the United States' most valued trade partner, and the key to the future prosperity of the American
economy.Jefferson's distrust of the British and disgust with their discriminatory trading policies were well known. As secretary of state, he
was determined to do all in his power to shift the United States' trade
away from Great Britain and toward his favorite foreign nation,
France.
But at every turn, it seemed,Jefferson was frustrated by Hamilton in
his design to end Great Britain's dominatingpresence in U.S. trade
relations. The secretary of state prepared a report for Congress recommending that the U.S. give preferential treatment to nations that did
not discriminate against American trade. France had made modest
concessions to American imports; Great Britain had not. As a result,
Jefferson concluded, there should be an adjustment in the tonnage
duties imposed on foreign carriers to reduce the duties on friendly,
nondiscriminatory nations like France. But the policy was never implemented-in large part, Jefferson suspected, because Hamilton had lobbied his allies in Congress to oppose it.
The final insult for Jefferson came in 1792, after he had begun negotiations with the British minister, George Hammond, to settle the outstanding differences of the two nations under the Peace Treaty of 1783.
No progress had been made sinceJefferson and Adams met with Lord
Carmarthen in 1786. British creditors continued to demand payment
from Americans for outstanding debts. The U.S. countered that British
troops must relinquish their military posts in the old Northwest Terri-
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tory, and that there should be reimbursement for British troops' confiscation of slaves and other property during the war.
Hammond had taken the initiative in the negotiation, submitting a
paper blaming the United States for every infraction of the treaty.Jefferson responded with a state paper of gigantic and elegant proportions. In 250 manuscript pages, a product of eight weeks of interviews
with officialsand research into the public record, the American secretary of state aggressivelymet each British charge with an explanation
and a countercharge. It was an astounding diplomatic tour defarce that
stunned Hammond. Over dinner withJefferson, the British minister'
said that the secretary of state's paper put matters in a different light,
and that he would need further instructions from London. But before
Jefferson could apply additional pressure on the British minister,
Hamilton intervened, assuring Hammond that Jefferson did not speak
for the administration and that his paper was an ill-conceived, regrettably anti-British attack. Given that critical knowledge of dissension
within the Washington Cabinet, Hammond and his superiors at
Whitehall felt no urgent need to respond toJefferson's demands. Nothing came of the secretary of state's work; every outstanding issue from
the peace treaty remained unresolved during the remainder of Jefferson's Cabinet term.
In 1792,Jefferson began to speak of "the heats and tumults of conflicting parties;' dividing the Cabinet and Congress into the categorical
"we" and "them." The "we" included Jefferson, Madison, and likeminded republicans who were committed to an agrarian-based economy that favored state sovereignty, popular democracy, and a closer
trade relationship with France. The "monarchial federalist" opposition
was led by Hamilton and, in Jefferson's eyes, was catapulting the
nation toward economic and political disaster, consolidating political
power in the federal government, building a huge national debt that
primarily benefited Northern speculators, and binding the nation to
the arrogant and discriminatory trade policies of Great Britain.
Relations between Jefferson and Hamilton spiraled downward, as
the rhetoric of their partisans in the press escalated. The National
Gazette, founded by Philip Freneau with the encouragement of both
Madison and Jefferson, began to publish regular attacks on Hamilton
as a dangerous consolidationist. Those attacks were answered by the
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Gazette ef the United States, which openly assailed Jefferson's philosophy
and his character.
The two antagonists eagerly joined the fray. Hamilton privately
referred to Jefferson's foreign policy as "a womanish attachment to
France and a womanish resentment against Great Britain." And in the
pages of the Gazette cf the United States, an article signed "An American"
and written in the distinctive style of the treasury secretary accused Jefferson of secretly working to undermine public confidence in the government. Jefferson countered by telling the president that Hamilton's
policies had poisoned public trust in the government and had led the
people "to occupy themselves and their capital in a species of gambling" that was "destructive of morality." Later, he enlisted a young
republican supporter, Virginia Congressman William Branch Giles, to
introduce a series of resolutions on the floor of the House of Representatives condemning Hamilton's economic policies.
The president counseled moderation and understanding between
his two most valued Cabinet members, but even the revered Washington was helpless to tamp down the raging controversy. When the
armies of revolutionary France declared war on Great Britain in ~793,
only ten days after King Louis XVI had been executed,Jefferson and
Hamilton's arguments over foreign policy suddenly posed immediate
dangers for the nation.Jefferson sided with France and urged the president to adopt a policy that recognized U.S. obligations to France
under the treaty signed between the two nations during the Revolutionary War. Hamilton countered that preferential treatment of France
would lead to war with Great Britain, a result to be avoided at all costs.
Washington's answer to both men was an officialproclamation of neutrality; this effectively favored Great Britain,Jefferson believed, since it
took no notice of the U.S.'s 1778 treaty with France.
For more than a year,Jefferson had been telling President Washington that he wanted to retire from public service. He had long expressed
his desire to return to private life. And after three years in the Cabinet,
it was quite obvious to Jefferson that Hamilton had the president's ear
and that his own advice was of decreasing importance. Jefferson's
warnings of the dangers of Hamilton's economic policies had largely
gone unheeded. To Jefferson, Washington's pattern was maddeningly
familiar. The president patiently listened to the arguments of both
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Hamilton and Jefferson and then-invariably, it seemed-sided with his
treasury secretary. That had been the case with the bank controversy,
as well as most of Hamilton's other economic initiatives. And inJefferson's mind, Washington held true to form in the debate over the U.S.'s
neutrality policy.
Despite pleas from the president that Jefferson remain in the Cabinet,
Jefferson announced in December 1793 that he was retiring from public
life to attend to his farm and family at Monticello. Few believed him.
Hamilton had already predicted that Jefferson would run for president.

With the indispensable organizational talents of Madison, Jefferson's
republican message spread from Monticello through county organizations and a growing network of sympathetic newspapers. The president was spared criticism, but the policies of his dominant Cabinet
member were not. It was time for the nation to return to the republican
principles on which it had been founded. Domestically, that meant the
rejection of Hamilton's monarchial economic policies. In foreign policy, the U.S. must stop mortgaging its future to the imperious British.
The Jay Treaty of 1794 provided Jefferson and his republican supporters with a ready campaign issue for the anticipated contested presidential election in 1796. Washington had sent ChiefjusticeJohnJay to
London to come to terms with a restive and not altogether friendly
British government. The president's declaration of neutrality had
momentarily placated Great Britain, but the increasingly debilitating
war with France had made the British navy bolder in confiscating the
cargoes on U.S. ships and impressing young American sailors into His
Majesty's service.
Jay negotiated as if his diplomatic choices were extremely narrow:
either sign a treaty with Great Britain that subordinated U.S. interests
to those of His Majesty's government or risk open warfare. Jay chose
the peaceful alternative, and Congress ratified the terms of the treaty.
When Washington signed the Jay Treaty, Jefferson denounced the
agreement as "nothing more than a treaty of alliance between England
and the Anglomen ofthis country against ... the people of the United
States." The French government was just as angry, accusing the U.S. of
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violating the terms of their 1778 treaty. Soon enough, France retaliated
by seizing cargoes on American ships with the same abandon as the
British appeared to be exercising under cover of the treaty.
The Jay Treaty became the political fault line between Federalists
and supporters of Jefferson's newly formed Democratic-Republican
party (known as Republicans)." In Virginia, the treaty was greeted with
widespread Republican condemnation, though there were pockets of
support from outnumbered Federalists. The most prominent defender
of the treaty in Virginia was John Marshall, now one of Richmond's
most respected attorneys as well as a prosperous landowner. President
Washington had been so impressed with Marshall's talents that he had
offered him the position of attorney general, but Marshall had
declined.
AlthoughJefferson began to take notice of Marshall, it was not the ·
kind that could have pleased either man. After Marshall was reelected
to the Virginia legislature in 1795,Jefferson wrote Madison that Marshall's hypocrisy ("acting under the mask of Republicanism") and his
"lax lounging manners" had made him popular in Richmond. But Jefferson was confident that Marshall could not continue to fool the people once his true politics forced him to "come forth in the plenitude of
his English principles."

Jefferson's old friend John Adams was his Federalist opponent in the
1796 presidential election. Though the two men were not as close as
they had been during their diplomatic days in Europe, they still
respected each other. And they agreed on at least one important subject: each despised Hamilton. Hamilton had retired from Washington's
Cabinet in 1795 to return to the private practice of law in New York
City but, nonetheless, retained great political influence. Adams represented the moderate Federalists, a fact that thoroughly alienated
Hamilton, who wanted the Federalists to act more aggressively in consolidating federal power and openly supporting Great Britain in her
war with France. Ironically, Jefferson treated his opponent, Adams,
*The concept of political parties in 1796 was a far cry from modem political organizations. Rather than rigidly disciplined organizations, Federalists and Republicans were
loosely formed political alliances.
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more honorably than did Hamilton. The treasury secretary worked
behind the scenes in support of Adams's running mate, Thomas Pinckney, with the hope that Pinckney might receive more electoral votes
than Adams. In contrast, Jefferson let it be known that if, by chance,
the election ended in a tie he would defer to Adams in the interest of a
harmonious transition of power.
When Adams eked out a victory over Jefferson by three electoral
votes, the defeated Republican candidate did not seem distraught or
hostile to the new president. Having accumulated the second-highest,
number of electoral votes,Jefferson became the nation's vice president
and pledged to cooperate with Adams, an attitude that was reciprocated by Adams." One of President Adams's first gestures of reconciliation toward Jefferson was to ask the vice president to represent the
United States on a diplomatic mission to France.Jefferson declined this
appointment on the advice of Madison, who disapproved of such a
cozy relationship between rival political leaders.
Undeterred by Jefferson's rejection, Adams was determined to
encourage bipartisanship in his diplomatic approach to the settlement
of the nation's differences with France. The president next proposed a
bipartisan three-member commission to negotiate a treaty in Paris.
Adams named Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who was already in
Paris, to the commission, as well as Elbridge Gerry, a moderate Federalist from Massachusetts and a close friend of Adams. As the third
member of the delegation, the president wanted Madison (who had
retired from the House of Representatives) to serve, but he refused.
Adams's replacement for Madison was John Marshall, an appointment
that would have momentous historic implications.
Two events in the late spring of 1797 changed the tenor of the political discourse between the controlling Federalists and Jefferson's Republicans. Adams, in response to what he considered France's hostile
actions toward the U.S., called Congress into special session in May and
·The original version of the electoral college required two candidates, both theoretically standing for the presidency, though one candidate was generally acknowledged
to be the preferred candidate for president. The candidate receiving the most electoral
votes was elected president; the candidate with the second-highest number of votes
became vice president. In 1796, when Federalists and Republicans each offered two
candidates, the system allowed for the election of a president (Adams) and vice president Gefferson) from different political alliances.
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delivered what Republicans termed a "war message" aimed at France's
ruling Directory. For the first time since Adams's inauguration,Jefferson
openly criticized the president, accusing him of unwarranted partisanship in his foreign policy. During the same month, a letter thatJefferson
had written in 1796 to his old friend and Virginia neighbor Philip
Mazzei was published. In the letter Jefferson made an apparent reference to Washington as one of the "men who were Samsons in the field
and Solomons in the council, but who have had their heads shorn by
the harlot England." The Federalists, Marshall included, never forgave
Jefferson for defaming the great Washington.
Battle lines between the Adams administration and Jefferson's Republicans were now irrevocably drawn. The vice president viewed
every Adams initiative with suspicion, particularly in the field of foreign
affairs, convinced that the Federalists were intent on a permanent al- ·
liance with monarchial Great Britain. At just this time, Marshall and
Gerry embarked on their diplomatic mission to Paris. The Richmond
lawyer's leadership role in the negotiation with the French government
marked the beginning of a conflict between Marshall and Jefferson that
would profoundly affect American politics and constitutional law.

